The Demise of Turkish Democracy and the Ally Europe Cannot Afford to Lose
- Alexander Cloke
- Apr 2
- 3 min read
On the 19th of March, just days before his likely election as the next presidential candidate for Türkiye’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, was arrested. Any sense of Turkish democracy went with him.
His supporters claim the charges, corruption and terrorism, to be spurious. Thus, some of the largest protests the country has seen in a decade have since broken out across Türkiye's largest cities, including Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, which are strongholds of opposition politics. Within hours of the arrest, Turkish stocks fell into their worst week since the 2008 financial crisis, with bonds and the Lira suffering a similar fate.
Make no mistake, this final step has, to some, seemed inevitable for some time. Since his election in 2014 as the first directly elected Turkish president, he has shifted power from the previously parliamentary, secular system towards the executive. International concerns over human rights, democracy and the rule of law, especially concerning similar crackdowns on opposition figures and journalists, have been increasing over recent years.
However, despite Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan firmly establishing himself as an authoritarian ruler of one of Eurasia’s most influential powers, shifting global political dynamics have left Europe in a difficult position. How do you navigate relations with a true autocrat when your future security depends on them?
For Erdoğan, this was the perfect time to strike. With the return of US President Donald Trump, along with his dramatic shifts in foreign policy and apparent admiration for strong-man leaders, Erdoğan has faced little pushback from even the most liberal Western leaders.
Despite this, the last few weeks' events will likely set back Türkiye’s bid to join the European Union. The country applied for membership of the EU (at the time the European Economic Community) in 1987, but little progress has been made towards membership since.
Many EU states, including France and Germany, have questioned Türkiye's human rights record, and broader disparities in democratic, judicial, legal, and economic standards have yet to be reconciled. Türkiye has also been embroiled in Cyprus for decades and has other territorial disputes with Greece. Both are EU members, so these issues would need to be resolved, as unlikely as it seems.
Ultimately, however, the recent developments likely put any prospect of membership in the dust for the foreseeable future.
Türkiye, however, holds a pivotal position within NATO and, therefore, must be kept onside for the emerging European security architecture. The country operates the second-largest army in the alliance and, as such, becomes vital to it in the years to come. Due to its location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the caucus region, as well as its control of the entrance to the black sea, it exerts incredible influence.
Whilst Erdoğan holds close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Türkiye has still provided aid to Ukraine. It has indicated the possibility of sending troops to the region to aid peacekeeping efforts. The two recently embarked on an expanded defence partnership, shoring up black sea security, which, as an area of paramount strategic importance to the Russian navy and shipping industries, will likely present a challenge to Russia in the coming years.
Türkiye has also been key to the fight against ISIS across northern Syria and Iraq over the last decade, conducting numerous group operations and airstrikes. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, unofficially backed by Türkiye, is the leading body of the coalition that recently overthrew Syria’s Assad regime, which Russia and Iran backed. A pro-Turkish Syria will allow Türkiye to exert further pressure on rivals Russia and Iran, pushing them from the region.
After decades of conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) - an insurgent group seeking the unification of Kurdish regions across Türkiye, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, and officially designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU, the US, and Türkiye - the group recently declared a unilateral ceasefire. While this can easily be framed as a victory, Erdoğan is likely to use it as an opportunity for further political consolidation.
As Türkiye’s strategic power develops abroad, Europe’s need to build strategic ties grows. But at the same time, it drifts further from the values the two once shared.
European policy cannot be indifferent to the developments in Türkiye, and it should maintain some semblance of moral leadership in any way it can. However, Europe still risks the fallout from potential problematic ties with such a regime.
But will the continent be able to bear those costs when security needs are on the line?
Ultimately, even if the country slips further into the kind of autocracy Europe is threatened by further north, Türkiye is simply, for the moment, an ally that Europe cannot afford to lose.
Tragically, reality may prove a better matchmaker for security alliances than values.
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